Evaluation of community pharmacists’ readiness to implement the Falsified Medicines Directive (Directive 2011/62/EC): an English cross-sectional survey with geospatial analysis by Barrett, Ravina
1Barrett R. BMJ Open 2020;10:e033405. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2019-033405
Open access 
Evaluation of community pharmacists’ 
readiness to implement the Falsified 
Medicines Directive (Directive 2011/62/
EC): an English cross- sectional survey 
with geospatial analysis
Ravina Barrett   1,2
To cite: Barrett R.  Evaluation 
of community pharmacists’ 
readiness to implement the 
Falsified Medicines Directive 
(Directive 2011/62/EC): 
an English cross- sectional 
survey with geospatial 
analysis. BMJ Open 
2020;10:e033405. doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2019-033405
 ► Prepublication history and 
additional material for this 
paper are available online. To 
view these files, please visit 
the journal online (http:// dx. doi. 
org/ 10. 1136/ bmjopen- 2019- 
033405).
Received 05 August 2019
Revised 04 December 2019
Accepted 10 December 2019
1School of Pharmacy and 
Biomolecular Sciences, 
University of Brighton, Brighton, 
UK
2School of Pharmacy and 
Biomedical Sciences, University 
of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK
Correspondence to
Mrs Ravina Barrett;  
 ravina. barrett@ port. ac. uk
Original research
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2020. Re- use 
permitted under CC BY- NC. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published by 
BMJ.
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This is the first study to evaluate the readiness of 
community pharmacies in England to implement 
the European Union’s Falsified Medicines Directive 
(Directive 2011/62/EC) by 9 February 2019.
 ► We invited pharmacists from 501 pharmacies across 
England to complete a survey.
 ► Postcodes of pharmacies were linked with free-
ly available data on Index of Multiple Deprivation 
scores, which provides an estimate of the socioeco-
nomic deprivation of the practice population.
 ► The interactive application helps to visualise the 
data easily: https://arcg.is/0q1mGf or https://por-
tuni.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.
html?id=95497aeae0cf4411abd8433d736b8989.
 ► Limitation of this study includes those inherent to 
surveys, particularly those dependent on retrospec-
tive recall.
AbStrACt
Objectives To evaluate the readiness to implement 
the Falsified Medicines Directive (FMD) by community 
pharmacies in England. Eight secondary objectives were 
assessed.
Setting Community/retail pharmacies.
Participants We invited pharmacists from 501 
pharmacies to complete a survey. Non- contractors, 
non- pharmacists or pharmacists practising abroad were 
excluded. We randomly selected addresses, ensuring that 
they were nationally representative.
Interventions We mailed the survey in October 2018 with 
a single follow- up in January 2019. Respondents were 
invited to provide self- reported answers. A prepaid self- 
addressed envelope was provided. We received favourable 
ethical approval.
results 102 responses (20.44% response rate) were 
received. Readiness to implement was poor: 4 (3.9%) 
said very much, while 40 (39.2%) said not at all and 29 
(28.4%) said not really. Increased workload and reduced 
profitability were anticipated, accompanied with improved 
patient safety. Prevalence of ‘substandard and falsified 
(SF) medical products’ was estimated at 1%–5%, with 
erectile dysfunction at greatest risk of falsification. 
Different packaging would raise suspicions. Five (4.9%) 
had identified SFs (p<0.001 one- sample binomial test). 
Of these, three (2.9%) informed the medicines agency. 
None had been involved in any public health campaigns. 
Confidence and self- efficacy was low. Strategies to reduce 
SFs reaching the public are described. Pharmacist’s role 
in combating SFs was elucidated. SFs were identified in 
deprived areas 4 (9%) more often than in affluent areas 1 
(2%).
Conclusions Many pharmacies are not ready to 
implement FMD, potentially not capturing anticipated 
benefits of the directive, with greatest risk of harm in 
deprived area. We further validated a confidence scale. 
Limited public health campaigns may result in a lack of 
awareness among pharmacy professionals and patients. 
Limited awareness of technologies to identify falsified 
medicines exist, though further training is welcome. A 
worrying trend of under- reporting maybe prevalent. A 
larger sample study using this survey would be valuable.
IntrOduCtIOn
There is no universally agreed definition of 
counterfeit/falsified medication and jurisdic-
tions around the world define these types of 
medicines in many different ways. WHO iden-
tifies ‘substandard and falsified (SF) medical 
products’1 2 that demonstrate public harm.3 
The European Union (EU) has a strong legal 
framework for the licensing, manufacturing 
and distribution of medicines supported by 
the EU member states in implementing the 
falsified medicines Directive.4 5 At writing, the 
UK remains an EU member state. At the end 
of the distribution chain, only licensed phar-
macies and approved retailers are allowed to 
offer medicines for sale, including legitimate 
sale via the internet.6 7
No specific definition of counterfeit 
medical product exists within English law and 
the national competent agency (The Medi-
cines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
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Agency (MHRA)) adopts the definition contained within 
the European Falsified Medicines Directive (FMD) and 
has provided guidance on its implementation. The final 
part of the Directive, the ‘safety features’ Delegated Regu-
lation (EU) 2016/161 comes into force on 9 February 
2019 in the UK.8
This requires every prescription only medicine and 
some pharmacy medicines to be scanned at point of 
dispensing (to check against a central database that they 
are not falsified, recalled or expired) at community phar-
macy level across the EU, before supplying to the patients. 
The pharmacists’ responsibilities are to (1) check that the 
antitampering device placed on the package by the manu-
facturer is intact before dispensing and (2) scan the 2D 
barcode and communicating with the National Medicine 
Verification System to change the status of the pack from 
‘active’ to ‘inactive dispensed’. The first requires visual 
inspection while the second requires a scanning tool.9–11 
This now forms a part of regulatory compliance inspec-
tions and can attract disciplinary actions against regis-
tered professionals and premises.12 13
Falsified medicines and medical devices are problem-
atic in both primary and secondary care as they are not 
subject to the rigorous quality standards and can create 
difficulty in identifying sources of contamination and 
public harm. The parallel import system in the EU also 
permit legitimate movement of medicines through the 
supply chain over large geographical territories, which is 
susceptible to infiltration by SF medicines.
Pharmacist’s ability to identify SF medication can help 
in thwarting public harm alongside implementation 
of the FMD. No studies of English pharmacist’s experi-
ences of implementing FMD exist. This study is needed 
because it seeks to understand the challenges faced by 
the healthcare team caring for National Health Service 
(NHS) patients and other under pressure models of 
care in the Western World. Challenges include growing 
patient demand, changing patterns of demand, insuffi-
cient funding in primary care, reduced access to general 
practitioners and addressing national health inequalities. 
From our 2016–2017 study,14 we hypothesise that the 
theme of ‘lack of resources’ may continue.
Preparing for FMD implementation is a fundamental, 
structural change in an already well- established pharmacy 
dispensing and checking processes that risk assesses and 
quality assures the core pharmacy business. Inserting 
an additional stage of ‘FMD compliance checking’ is 
intended to further risk reduce and safeguard the public.
Several change management theories exist15–21 for 
sustaining positive change. Rogers’ Diffusion of Innova-
tion Theory22 introduced five change phases: knowledge 
(education and communication to expose staff to the 
change), persuasion (use of change champions to pique 
staff interest; peers persuading peers), decision (staff 
decide whether to accept or reject the change), imple-
mentation (putting new processes into practice) and 
confirmation (staff recognise the value and benefits of 
the change and continue to use changed processes).
Change is inevitable in healthcare. A significant 
problem specific to healthcare is that almost two- thirds 
of all change projects fail for many reasons, such as poor 
planning, unmotivated staff, deficient communication or 
excessively frequent changes.23–25 The challenges relate 
to three features of their organisational environment: 
the fact that organisational change is mostly driven by 
external pressures; the speed with which change has to be 
implemented and the frequency of change initiatives.26
The lack of research evidence suggests that the change 
process, up to the point of the research period, was 
managed using a largely directive approach in the UK. 
However, FMD poses a national and Europe wide ‘change 
process’ that is at risk of failure for the reasons identi-
fied. Assessing the geographical progress of implementa-
tion (and SFs detection rates inherent there) may inform 
policy and prevent health inequalities from emerging, 
because of this legislation.
The current study on FMD implementation reflects 
how well the change process is fully characterised and 
supported by the many stakeholders, including retail 
pharmacy chains and employed pharmacists (especially 
financially in the workload and time allowance of the 
responsible staff). This includes the provision of addi-
tional resources (eg, computers, employee time, etc.), 
preparedness and ongoing provision of training, and 
managing any unexpected, unintended, consequences of 
such a change.
This highlights the need to describe current practices 
around identifying and reporting of SFs, so that in time, 
we may be able to describe the impact of FMD on phar-
macy services and its effectiveness. We hypothesise that 
pharmacist’s confidence of handling SFs may change 
over time and so, capturing a snapshot now may be useful 
as a benchmark. The study also gives voice to the phar-
macy professionals who are expected to deliver the imple-
mentation, in a naturalistic environment (not previously 
done). These concepts link our primary and secondary 
objectives to provide a coherent rationale to our study 
objectives.
Objectives
The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the 
readiness to implement FMD (Directive 2011/62/EC) by 
9 February 2019 by community pharmacies in England. 
Secondary objectives were to:
a. Assess the impact of change on current operations.
b. Establish prior knowledge of prevalence of SF 
medicines.
c. Determine what visual checks are done to identify SF 
medicines.
d. Establish current practice around the identification 
and reporting of SF medicines.
e. Establish current levels of awareness, involvement and 
training in public health by pharmacists with respect 
SF medicines.
f. Explore pharmacists confidence of handling SF 
medicines.
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g. Seek opinions on policy and understand the pharma-
cist’s role in combating SF medicines.
h. Examine association with geospatial location and 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores.
MethOdS
We invited pharmacists from 501 pharmacies that 
contribute to the NHS’s Business Services Authority (BSA) 
dispensing data across England to complete a survey, as 
the BSA is responsible for pharmacy reimbursements and 
collates accurate prescription data on behalf of the NHS. 
Community pharmacies that are not NHS contractors, 
non- pharmacists or pharmacists practising abroad were 
excluded. Addresses were taken from publicly available 
BSA website (March 2018) to gain a nationally represen-
tative sample.
We selected them randomly between contractor 
code (FAQ87 to FYR36), which resulted in recruiting a 
single large national pharmacy chain. We ensured that 
they were nationally representative with respect to the 
number of prescription forms (invited sample mean 
5355, SD 2044 versus English population mean 3564, 
SD 2692) and number of prescription items dispensed 
(invited sample mean 10817, SD 4611 vs English popula-
tion mean 9875, SD 5480). This permits comparison with 
like for like businesses (approximately equal burden of 
work, similar team size and similar business complexity) 
across the country, therefore allowing fair comparison 
between pharmacies invited to study and the wider phar-
macy population.
We mailed the cross- sectional survey in October 2018 
with a single follow- up of non- responders in January 
2019. Respondents were invited to provide self- reported 
answers. A prepaid self- addressed envelope was included. 
We sought and received favourable institutional ethical 
approval. No financial (or similar) benefits were offered 
to minimise biassed responses.27
Questionnaire
The questionnaire was composed of items relating to the 
objectives. The full survey is available in online supple-
mentary appendix A. A previously validated scale14 was 
incorporated in this survey.
We piloted the questionnaire via six steps. Question-
naire was pretested by researchers critically appraising 
the scale in a research- team focus group. This comprised 
two external practising community pharmacists, other 
academics with recent community and hospital practice 
experience, and student researchers. This allowed for 
detection and deletion of ambiguous words, misinterpre-
tation of questions, poor questions and sensitive ques-
tions. Amendments and improvements were made to 
the format, structure and content. To improve internal 
validity and reliability, the survey instrument was piloted 
with another external community pharmacist, and cogni-
tive testing (read aloud) was conducted. It took less than 
10 min to complete the final survey.
There are 11 619 community pharmacies in England 
in 2017–2018.28 To be representative (assuming confi-
dence level of 95%, CI of 10%, SE of 5%, relative SE of 
10%), a minimum sample size of 95 was calculated. To 
achieve this, we invited 501 pharmacies as our previous 
response rates range between 15% and 25% in similar 
studies.14 29 30 Analyses were undertaken using SPSS31 to 
present proportions, descriptive statistics and hypothesis 
testing at 95% confidence level and 5% significance. 
Missing data are presented, and any subgroup analysis 
will be descriptive. Comments are thematically anal-
ysed.32 33
Postcodes of pharmacies were linked with freely avail-
able data on IMD score,34 an estimate of the socioeco-
nomic deprivation of the practice population and NHS 
dispensing data.35 The IMD is the official measure of 
relative deprivation for small areas in England and the 
latest scores are presented in IMD 2015 data. It is a 
composite score of seven underlying domains related 
to income deprivation, employment deprivation, educa-
tion, skills and training deprivation, health deprivation 
and disability, crime, barriers to housing and services and 
living environment deprivation.34 We were interested to 
see if deprivation and SFs detection and reporting was 
linked in any way—which we find it is (as per our discus-
sion and conclusion).
We mapped our results using ArcGIS online (https:// 
arcg. is/ 0q1mGf, legend: yellow dot, red dot and green 
dot represent those who are ‘somewhat’ and ‘very 
much’ ready to implement FMD by the 9 February 
2019, who said FMD would affect workload and those 
who said FMD would affect business profitability, respec-
tively. Orange dot represents those who had used the 
Yellow Card Scheme (YCS) for reporting SF, blue dot 
represents those who had ever identified SF and green 
dot represents all respondents). We created an app with 
several layers to visualise the data easily, freely and publi-
cally: https:// portuni. maps. arcgis. com/ apps/ webap-
pviewer/ index. html? id= 9549 7aea e0cf 4411 abd8 433d 
736b8989.
We mapped our responses alongside the IMD 2015 data 
(ranks: every postcode has a rank from 1, which is the 
most deprived area up to 32 844 that is the least deprived 
area. Deciles are published alongside ranks to assess rela-
tive deprivation and we have used these).
At the end of our survey, we included brief guidance 
on reporting counterfeit products via the YCS (https:// 
yellowcard. mhra. gov. uk/ counterfeit- products/) oper-
ated by the MHRA. Participants can complete a two- page 
form to report a suspected counterfeit product (fake 
medicine or fake medical device) including any related 
side effects or safety concerns to the YCS. Participants 
can register on the site when submitting a report, or can 
register in advance. Alternatively, participants can report 
a suspected counterfeit anonymously by contacting the 
24 hours counterfeit hotline telephone number on +44 
(0)20 3080 6701.
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Table 1 Characteristics of survey respondents (n=102)
Respondent variables
Frequency 
(percentage %; 
n=102)
Sex
  Male 46 (45.1%)
  Female 51 (50.0%)
  Preferred not to say 5 (4.9%)
Years of registration experience
  0–5 37 (36.3%)
  6–10 26 (25.5%)
  11–15 20 (19.6%)
  16–20 1 (1.0%)
  >20 years 18 (17.6%)
Working hours (per week)
  16–24 3 (2.9%)
  25–34 10 (9.8%)
  35–44 77 (75.5%)
  45–54 12 (11.8%)
Figure 1 Impact on community pharmacy workload.
Figure 2 Impact on community pharmacy profitability.
no patient and public involvement
We did not involve patients or the public in our work. 
This is likely to be done in the future.
We used the Strengthening the Reporting of Observa-
tional Studies in Epidemiology cross- sectional reporting 
guidelines.36
reSultS
In total, 102 responses (20.44% response rate) were 
received (two closures and abatements), satisfying our 
sample size needs. Demographic data are summarised in 
table 1.
Table 1 shows a sex ratio in line with the latest census.37 
Most (62%) responders had 10 years or less practice expe-
rience, with 75.5% working full- time hours. We enquired 
how ready respondents were to implement this directive. 
Forty (39.2%) said not at all, 29 (28.4%) said not really, 
14 (13.7%) were undecided, 12 (11.8%) said somewhat 
and 4 (3.9%) said very much, 3 (2.9%) missing.
We enquired if adequate equipment and expenses were 
prepared (eg, computer terminals, scanners, compliance 
software, include initial set- up, IT, both software and 
hardware, plus ongoing operational costs). Twenty- two 
(21.6%) said not at all, 26 (25.5%) said not really, 12 
(11.8%) were undecided, 31 (30.4%) said somewhat and 
11 (10.8%) said very much.
Impact of change on current operations
We perceived changes to workload and profitability, as 
shown in figures 1 and 2.
Improved patient safety is the desired outcome of this 
directive, so we enquired how this might be impacted 
(table 2).
Prior knowledge of prevalence of SF medicines
We wanted to know what percentage of medicines are 
believed to be falsified in the UK, as an indicator of prior 
knowledge of prevalence of SF medicines (see figures 3 
and 4).
We asked about the most likely sources of falsified medi-
cine: 59 (56.2%) said ‘internet pharmacies’, 21 (20.0%) 
said ‘personal importation’, 23 (21.9%) said ‘professional 
falsifier’, 2 (1.9%) said ‘other’ (of which 1 did not elab-
orate and another said ‘including illegal websites’), 1 
missing. Three respondents gave combination answers.
Finally, we asked what were the most commonly falsi-
fied medicines in the UK and invited multiple responses. 
Seven said ‘anticholesterol’, 5 said ‘cancer’, 77 said 
‘erectile dysfunction’, 5 said ‘heart problems’, 32 said 
‘weight loss’, 6 said ‘other’ (benzodiazepines, painkillers, 
anabolic steroids) and 2 missing.
Visual checks done to identify SF medicines
We asked what would raise suspicions of an SF. Forty said 
‘different distribution route’, 40 said ‘different label-
ling’, 87 said ‘different packaging to original packaging’, 
26 said ‘different product composition’ (eg, ingredients 
including excipients), 50 ‘different source’ (eg, different 
manufacturer or country of origin) and 3 said ‘other’ 
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Table 2 Impact on patient safety
N (%)
Does not improve 
patient safety 
at all
Does not improve 
patient safety Undecided
Somewhat improves 
patient safety
Very much improves 
patient safety Missing
Patient 
safety
– 4 (3.9%) 14 (13.7%) 41 (40.2%) 38 (37.3%) 5 (4.9%)
Figure 3 Perceived prevalence of substandard and falsified 
(SF) medicines.
Figure 4 Medicines believed to be falsified from online 
suppliers.
with reasons including cost, foreign text and medicine’s 
appearance.
Practice around the identification and reporting of SF 
medicines
Five (4.9%) had identified SF, 86 (84.3%) had never, 
11 (10.8%) missing (p<0.001 one- sample binomial test, 
95% CI 1.95±0.0471). In such circumstance, three (2.9%) 
informed the MHRA and five explanatory comments 
were received: ‘Patient didn’t want to report it she bought it 
from online pharmacy, I would contact MHRA’ (not reported 
to MHRA). ‘It was bought in by a patient who had bought it 
from a friend and wanted to check if it was genuine. Advised 
not to take’ (not reported to MHRA). ‘Referred patient back 
to where they purchased it’ (not reported to MHRA). ‘Yellow 
card’ and ‘Melatonin’ were both reported to MHRA.
Twenty- one (20.6%) kept records when encountering 
potential SF, 56 (54.9%) did not, 25 (24.5%) missing 
(p<0.001 one- sample binomial test, 95% CI 1.73±0.1). 
Eight participants who kept records went on to elab-
orate with comments (major theme of recording and 
reporting): ‘If we came across any on our (proprietary) system’, 
‘Reporting on company system’, ‘Online reporting tools of phar-
macy events’, ‘I would keep records’, ‘In store records’, ‘Hypo-
thetically POM register, internal reporting system and Yellow 
card’, ‘Details of the medicine, Name, manufacturer, distributor, 
strength, form’, ‘Incident report sent online to headquarters’.
We enquired which national agency would they contact, 
if any. Nine said Department of Health, 17 said European 
Medicines Agency, 7 said Royal Pharmaceutical Society, 
74 said MHRA, 15 said General Pharmaceutical Council 
and 3 said ‘other’, with reasons including ‘Head office for 
advice, then appropriate agency’, ‘company head office’ and 
‘[name] support office’.
Current awareness, involvement and training in public health
None had been involved in any campaigns regarding SF, 91 
(89.2%) said no, and 11 (10.8%) missing. No campaign 
was named, though, 8 (7.8%) believed that the campaigns 
they encountered were effective, while 42 (41.2%) did 
not, 52 (51.0%) missing (p<0.001 one- sample binomial 
test, 95% CI 1.91±0.121).
Six (5.9%) had ever used the YCS for SF, 84 (82.4%) 
had not, 12 (11.8%) missing (p<0.001 one- sample bino-
mial test, 95% CI 1.93±0.0519). Thirty- seven (36.3%) said 
yes this scheme is useful in combating SF, 34 (33.3%) said 
no and 31 (30.4%) missing.
To try and corroborate our findings to a nationally 
representative sample, we separately placed a freedom 
of information (FOI) request with the MHRA in October 
2018 to request data regarding UK suspected adverse drug 
reactions (ADRs) that have been reported with suspected 
counterfeit or SF (query ref: GENQ-00131558). Where a 
patient has experienced a suspected ADR to a medicine, 
even if the medicine is suspected to be counterfeit or 
falsified, this is recorded on their database. The MHRA 
has received a total of 70 UK spontaneous suspected ADR 
reports associated with SF for the period 1 July 1963–9 
October 2018.
Three (2.9%) had seen the ‘Postcard Guidance for 
Patients’38 leaflet, 88 (86.3%) had not and 11 (10.8%) 
missing (p<0.001 one- sample binomial test, 95% CI 
1.97±0.037). Fourteen (13.7%) were aware of tech-
nologies in place to identify SF, 76 (74.5%) were not, 
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Figure 5 Confidence regarding handling falsified medicines (p<0.001 one- sample χ2 test for all statements), percentages have 
been rounded to whole numbers. SF, substandard and falsified.
12 (11.8%) missing (p<0.001 one- sample binomial 
test, 95% CI 1.84±0.0752). Technologies quoted in 11 
comments presented two themes of barcode scanning 
and hologram use, and 91 missing. Thirty- six (35.3%) 
believed that technologies were effective in combating SF, 
28 (27.5%) did not and 38 (37.3%) missing. Three (2.9%) 
had received any training regarding SF, 88 (86.3%) had 
not and 11 (10.8%) missing (p<0.001 one- sample bino-
mial test, 95% CI 1.97±0.037). Seventy (68.6%) would 
participate in such training, 13 (12.7%) would not and 
19 (18.6%) missing (p<0.001 one- sample binomial test, 
95% CI 1.12±0.107).
Confidence regarding handling SF medicines
Then, we sought strength of opinion on a validated 
scale,14 presented in figure 5. These cover statements 
16–26 (online supplementary appendix A).
It is important to note that the scales was originally 
validated in a smaller sample (n=50) within Hampshire, 
UK. Validity and reliability are two fundamental elements 
in the evaluation of a measurement instrument. Validity 
is concerned with the extent to which an instrument 
measures what it is intended to measure. Reliability is 
concerned with the ability of an instrument to measure 
consistently. It should be noted that the reliability of an 
instrument is closely associated with its validity. An instru-
ment cannot be valid unless it is reliable.39 Cronbach’s 
alpha is the most widely used objective measure of reli-
ability. There are different reports about the acceptable 
values of alpha, ranging from 0.70 to 0.95.40–42
Previously, we reported a 0.728 Cronbach’s alpha (on 
standardised items) of the 11 item (Q16–26) scale.14 
Reliability statistics were recalculated here and a Cron-
bach’s alpha (on standardised items) of the scale was 
0.675 in this study (n=100, 2 missing). This is very close to 
0.70 and we accept this sufficiently demonstrates validity. 
We did a further scale analysis with a Cronbach’s alpha 
split- half in part 1 (the items are: Q16, Q17, Q18, Q19, 
Q20 and Q21.) and part 2 (the items are: Q22, Q23, Q24, 
Q25 and Q26.). We found the Cronbach’s alpha for part 
1 to be 0.672, and for part 2 was 0.753. The correlation 
between forms was 0.074, the Spearman- Brown coef-
ficient of equal and unequal length was 0.138 and the 
Guttman Split- half coefficient was 0.138, demonstrating 
good validity and reliability.
We have also presented current and previously vali-
dated means and SD to assess validity of our results and 
their relative difference (see online supplementary table 
1 of appendix B), which shows small deviations from our 
original findings, except in statements 23, 25 and 26. Our 
study provides further face validity to this confidence 
scale, in a nationally representative sample.
Opinions on policy and the pharmacists’ role in combating SF 
medicines
We enquired how we could reduce SF reaching the public. 
Forty- seven comments were received and present the 
following major and subthemes: (1) public health educa-
tion, subtheme of (a) public education and (b) profes-
sional education (of all involved in supply chain); (2) 
(government) regulation and enforcement, subtheme of 
(a) regulated online sales and (b) regulatory control; (3) 
supply chain management, subtheme of (a) role of the 
manufacturers, (b) role of the wholesalers and (c) role of 
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Table 3 Respondent’s demographics versus Index of 
Multiple Deprivation decile (1 poorest, 10 richest) distribution
Deprived 
decile (1–3) 
N, %
Affluent 
decile (4–10) 
N, %
Frequency of respondents
  n, % 50, 100% 52, 100%
Gender (n=102)
  Male 23, 46% 23, 44%
  Female 25, 50% 26, 50%
  Other 2, 4% 3, 6%
Years of registered 
experience (n=102)
  0–5 17, 34% 20, 38%
  6–10 11, 22% 15, 29%
  11–15 11, 22% 9, 17%
  16–20 1, 2% 0, 0%
  >20 years 10, 20% 8, 15%
Working hours per week 
(n=102)
  16–24 1, 2% 2, 4%
  25–34 8, 16% 2, 4%
  35–44 32, 64% 45, 87%
  45–54 9, 18% 3, 6%
Ever used the YCS for SF 
(n=90)
  Yes 3, 7% 3, 7%
  No 42, 93% 42, 93%
Seen the ‘Postcard Guidance 
for Patients’ leaflet? (n=91)
  Yes 1, 2% 2, 4%
  No 45, 98% 43, 96%
Aware of any technologies in 
place to identify SF? (n=90)
  Yes 6, 13% 8, 18%
  No 39, 87% 37, 82%
Ever received any training 
regarding SF? (n=91)
  Yes 2, 4% 1, 2%
  No 44, 96% 44, 98%
Ever identified SF? (n=91)
  Yes 4, 9% 1, 2%
  No 42, 91% 44, 98%
Percentages (adjusted bases) have been rounded to whole 
numbers, small numbers may not add to 100%.
SF, substandard and falsified; YCF, Yellow Card Scheme.
all (manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacy); (4) seri-
alisation (track and trace); and (5) reporting to the regu-
lator, medical staff and internally to pharmacy. Detailed 
analysis is presented in online supplementary table 2 of 
appendix B.
We then asked what role can pharmacists play in 
combating falsified medicines. Thirty- seven comments 
were received with the major themes of (1) build into 
accuracy check; (2) complex and multifactorial; (3) 
education and training; (4) identify and report; (5) not 
pharmacist’s role; (6) public awareness; (7) regulator’s 
job; (8) reputable sources; (9) resources and (10) vigi-
lance and action. Detailed analysis is presented in online 
supplementary table 3 of appendix B.
Five comments were additionally received (see online 
supplementary table 4 of appendix B) with major themes: 
(1) not a pharmacist’s job; (2) quality supply chain; (3) 
technical difficulties; (4) wholesaler’s duty; and (5) YCS 
ineffective.
examine geospatial location and IMd by decile
We found that our sample was well distributed with good 
geographical representation of urban and rural residents, 
representing population densities fairly well: https:// 
arcg. is/ 0q1mGf. We stratified the data by decile (table 3) 
and visually assessed our maps. The data were segre-
gated in near- even portions representing deprived areas 
versus affluent areas for easy comparison. With respect 
to inequalities, there seem to be minimal except for the 
detection rates of SFs, which is higher in more deprived 
areas (see Q32a in online supplementary appendix C for 
details).
dISCuSSIOn
Most responders were not ready to implement FMD on 
the deadline, except four pharmacies and many did not 
know that this implementation was imminent.
Impact of change on current operations
FMD- related changes were perceived as disruptive to 
normal business flow and likely to negatively affect work-
loads (59.8%). In turn, 22.5% perceived this to negatively 
impact profitability and 12.7% believes that it might 
increase profitability. Perhaps, some limitation of this 
survey question is that the participants were not them-
selves business owners, but employees within a larger 
business. We cautiously hypothesise that by their nature, 
they maybe more accurate at assessing impact to work-
load, but perhaps not to profitability. However, we do not 
know. Few (3.9%) perceived this did not improve patient 
safety and 77.5% believes that it might improve patient 
safety. Improved patient safety is the main purpose of 
FMD, so it is interesting to note that more than 10% 
(13.7%) of practitioners were undecided about this. This 
leads us to cautiously hypothesise that many participants 
believe the FMD adds more to the administrative burden, 
than improved patient safety.
Prior knowledge of prevalence of SF medicines
There was unimodal distribution in the opinion of the 
percentage of medicines believed to be falsified in the 
UK, with a mode around 1%–5%, which matches WHO 
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estimates.3 Recent data show that the total number 
of items dispensed in 2017 was 1105.8 million.35 This 
represents 11.06–55.29 million dispensed items that 
could be falsified, each with a potential to harm patients.
The percentage of medicines believed to be falsified 
from online suppliers, followed a near- normal distri-
bution with a mode around 41%–60% from online 
suppliers. Responders believe the legitimate supply chain 
to be sufficiently protected, but have anxieties around 
online sources of medicines that are at a greater risk of 
falsification and may lead to greater public harm, which 
is supported by the wider literature.43–48 This phenom-
enon was supported in the answer around the most likely 
source of SF, which were identified as mainly originating 
from internet pharmacies. The most commonly falsified 
medicines in the UK was perceived to be erectile dysfunc-
tion product followed by weight loss medication.
Visual checks are done to identify SF medicines
Visual cues that would make pharmacists suspicious of a 
medicine being falsified included different packaging to 
the original packaging and a different source. The most 
commonly falsified medicines in the UK, their physical 
appearance and who to report it to were in line with the 
wider literature.49 50
Practice around the identification and reporting of SF 
medicines
Off the five people who had identified SF, two reported it 
to the MHRA and three did not. Four were from deprived 
postcodes, whereas one was from an affluent area. While 
five is a very small number, we do not know the frequency 
at which they detected SFs. Five respondents represent 
1% of the invited sample and 4.9% of all respondents. 
Upscaling these numbers to a national level would trans-
late to 570 detections of SFs, without accounting for the 
cost of mitigating the damage to patients that may come 
from these SF medicines (while assuming: pharmacist 
detection of a single SF medicine, 11 619 pharmacies 
nationally, 5% identified SFs). We also do not know if 
there is likely to be a cluster effect (isolated to a specific 
area) or a nationwide effect of these detections. These 
findings are internationally relevant because of similar 
globally reported trends in major developed econo-
mies.3 51
There seems to be a worrying practice of not reporting 
ADRs irrespective of point of purchase or local circum-
stance. This provides tentative support for our FOI request 
analysis, which indicates under- reporting of suspected 
ADRs related to SFs. Record keeping and ADR reporting 
are an essential and integral part of a pharmacist’s duty. 
SF medicines pose an uncommon problem and so how 
professionals deal with this can be varied. However, more 
needs to be done to raise awareness of the need to report 
SF to the appropriate agency (ie, MHRA) and the impor-
tance of reporting related ADRs too. Reducing public 
harm is inherently acknowledged as key by responders.
Current awareness, involvement and training in public health
Messages raising public awareness of SFs has not been 
reaching the public via pharmacy professionals, which 
raises important questions about promoting this message 
and getting it out to frontline staff and patients. While 
all pharmacy undergraduates are taught about the YCS 
in UK universities, this does not translate into practice 
as evidenced by general under- reporting52 53 of ADRs. 
Few respondents had reported SFs but more believed it 
helped to combat SFs. Six out of 501 of our respondents 
had reported SFs. Assuming our findings are nationally 
representative, we anticipate 140 reports. Therefore, the 
70 reports lodged with the MHRA, we believe, indicate an 
under- reporting (see the Current awareness, involvement 
and training in public health section). This is supported 
in comments relating to informing the MHRA (see the 
Practice around the identification and reporting of SF 
medicines).
Only three respondents had seen the ‘Postcard Guid-
ance for Patients’ leaflet, which conflicts with their earlier 
responses to involvement in any campaigns regarding 
SF but can be explained by prior training. A subgroup 
analysis of these three responders revealed that they 
were two women and one man, with 0–5 years and 11–15 
years of practice experience, working 25–34 hours and 
35–44 hours per week and all believed that FMD would 
greatly improve patient safety. All had received training 
regarding SF and all would further seek such training. 
While most respondents were not aware of technologies 
in place to identify SF, a handful could name some strate-
gies in place and overall envisaged them having a limited 
impact in combating SFs. While most respondents did 
not receive training, 69% would participate in a training 
programme regarding SFs.
Confidence regarding handling SF medicines
Pharmacists accepted that SF medicines pose a significant 
problem and that their lack of knowledge and resources 
was potentially detrimental. They accepted a degree of 
liability in such circumstances and that their intervention 
could disrupt use of SF medicines. Further training and 
listening to the patients could be useful in overcoming 
these barriers. Low scores were generally given for self 
and peer group for confidence, capability, vigilance and 
knowledge levels.
Online supplementary appendix B table 1 shows 
slightly lower agreement in our sample with the state-
ments: ‘The majority of my fellow pharmacists in the 
UK are confident regarding falsified medicines’, ‘I’m 
constantly vigilant of encountering falsified medicines 
when checking prescriptions’ and ‘I have enough knowl-
edge to identify falsified medicines’. This is normal and 
as expected because our sample is nearly double the orig-
inal sample size. In this study, heterogeneous constructs 
or some missing data may have contributed to the lower 
value of Cronbach’s alpha, but demonstrates criterion 
validity.
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Table 4 Bias assessment
NHS dispensing monthly 
(March 2018) statistics
Number of 
prescription 
forms 
(nominal)
Number of 
prescription 
items 
(nominal)
Mean
  England population 3564 7132
  Invited 5355 10 817
  Respondent 5421 10 953
  Non- respondent 5349 10 800
SD
  England population 2692 5167
  Invited 2044 4611
  Respondent 1918 4302
  Non- respondent 2077 4699
Opinions on policy and the pharmacists’ role in combating SF 
medicines
Strong opinions on policy surrounding public health 
education, regulation and enforcement, supply chain 
management, product serialisation and reporting were 
made, though a greater regulatory role and supply chain 
integrity are expected by pharmacists. The role of the 
pharmacist was to build these checks into their accuracy 
checking, encourage education and training, identify and 
report SF medicines, raise public awareness, source medi-
cines from reputable sources, have adequate resources 
and be vigilant and act as necessary. Complex operational 
factors could make delivering all these difficult. Some 
respondents did not believe that this was part of the phar-
macist role and that it was the regulators job.
examine geospatial location and IMd by decile
We achieved a well- distributed sample, with good 
geographical representation. Analysing the data shows 
the following in deprived areas versus affluent counter-
parts: inadequate equipment (22.9% vs 22.5%), lower 
knowledge (seen the ‘Postcard Guidance for Patients’ 
leaflet? (2% vs 4%)), unawareness of technologies (87% 
vs 82%), slightly higher rates of training (4% vs 2%), 
higher rates of identifying SFs (9% vs 2%) (table 3 and 
online supplementary appendix C), though none were 
statistically significant.
Service inequalities by location were minimal, except for 
the detection rates of SFs, which is surprising in a single 
organisational structure. These premises may require 
more resources, time and support to meet compliance 
standards. This subanalysis provides a snapshot of the 
deprivation landscape now and provides a benchmark 
for future evaluation to see if these pharmacies (and the 
communities they serve) get left behind.
Strengths and limitations
We report on a nationally representative sample in the 
first study of its kind, examining readiness to implement 
FMD by pharmacies in England. Limitation of this study 
include those inherent to surveys, particularly those 
dependent on retrospective recall.
To assess non- respondent bias, we examined dispensing 
statistics of the population, invited participants, respon-
dents and non- respondents (table 4). Respondents 
tended to be from slightly busier pharmacies than non- 
respondents, though by a small margin, making our find-
ings nationally and internationally representative51 and 
generalisable.
Future research
A larger study using our survey would be valuable to further 
statistically validate our questionnaire (online supple-
mentary appendix A) and we encourage the research 
community to use it to report their findings. The rollout 
of this implementation needs to be studied longitudinally 
to assess its full impact including on patient safety. Qual-
itative studies with participants that have (and have not) 
identified and reported SFs may help explain why they 
reported it (or did not) and to explore ways of improving 
detection and reporting, to reduce public harm. More 
needs to be done about raising public awareness.
COnCluSIOnS
We find pharmacies are not ready to implement FMD 
and this remains an ongoing concern 9 months from 
implementation.12 54 55 Impact on workload and profit-
ability were areas of concern, though improved patient 
safety was anticipated. Of the total number of medicines 
dispensed in England, 1%–5% are believed to be falsi-
fied, with a greater proportion from online sources with 
erectile dysfunction and weight loss medicines at risk of 
falsification. Different packaging and different sources of 
medicine would raise suspicion among pharmacists. We 
found under- reporting of detected SF medicines, with low 
confidence and self- efficacy on SFs among pharmacists. 
Limited public health campaigns may result in a lack of 
awareness among pharmacy professionals and patients. 
Limited awareness of technologies in place identifying 
SFs exist, though further training is welcome. Policy 
changes in the area of public health education, regula-
tion and enforcement, supply chain management, serial-
isation and reporting are important. Geospatial analysis 
revealed that more SFs were identified in deprived areas, 
potentially putting these patients at greater risk of harm 
from SF medicines and not capturing the full benefits of 
FMD implementation.
In conclusion, pharmacies are not FMD compliant 
and limited practical help and support seem available. A 
lack of resources, knowledge, competency, training and 
confidence make this a difficult directive to implement 
successfully. There is a risk that pharmacists maybe navi-
gating this change in isolation, potentially coming to 
innovative workarounds to meet ongoing business targets 
with untold consequences. At a pharmacy- corporate level, 
sanctions for non- compliance maybe stressful, costly, 
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time consuming and unattractive as these costs do not 
support business operations (or profitability) and maybe 
perceived as bureaucratic. Improved patient safety is 
anticipated, but difficult to quantify. Our study provides 
much needed data for evidence- based decision- making.
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